LRA chain-of-command remains in doubt, effect on the peace process uncertain
The UN Secretary-General's April 2008 report on Sudan reveals that LRA attacks on civilians in the southern half of the country have been on the rise in recent months. It also states that LRA rebels responsible for the attacks are likely splinter groups operating outside Kony's direct authority. The existence of LRA splinter groups in south Sudan, as well as difficulty concretely verifying responsibility for alleged LRA attacks in eastern DR Congo and southeast Central African Republic (CAR), raises serious questions about what effect a broken chain-of-command within the LRA could have on the Juba peace process and prospects for demobilizing the LRA.
Citing reports of LRA attacks on civilians in the region, some observers have argued that the peace process has failed and that renewed efforts are needed to confront the LRA militarily and arrest top leaders indicted by the International Criminal Court. Indeed, attacks on civilians by the LRA remain a grave concern and immediate efforts should be taken to protect civilians regardless of what commanders are responsible. However, until more is understood about the control Kony exercises over outlying commanders, it will be difficult to assess what these LRA attacks indicate about his willingness to sign and abide by a final peace agreement. Similarly difficult to predict will be the effect military options could have on the ability (and will) of the LRA and its splinter groups to continue attacks on civilians. More understanding of the LRA chain-of-command is also needed to design appropriate strategies to demobilize different LRA factions led by commanders who may be more (or less) willing than Kony to lay down their weapons in the event that final peace agreement is (or is not) signed.
Citing reports of LRA attacks on civilians in the region, some observers have argued that the peace process has failed and that renewed efforts are needed to confront the LRA militarily and arrest top leaders indicted by the International Criminal Court. Indeed, attacks on civilians by the LRA remain a grave concern and immediate efforts should be taken to protect civilians regardless of what commanders are responsible. However, until more is understood about the control Kony exercises over outlying commanders, it will be difficult to assess what these LRA attacks indicate about his willingness to sign and abide by a final peace agreement. Similarly difficult to predict will be the effect military options could have on the ability (and will) of the LRA and its splinter groups to continue attacks on civilians. More understanding of the LRA chain-of-command is also needed to design appropriate strategies to demobilize different LRA factions led by commanders who may be more (or less) willing than Kony to lay down their weapons in the event that final peace agreement is (or is not) signed.