The LRA Conflict in Uganda: A Brief Overview
Root Causes
The twenty-year-old war in northern Uganda is a complex conflict fuelled not only by the fighting of the Lord’s Resistance Army, which is waging war against the Ugandan government and terror against the Acholi tribe's civilian population, but also by the grievances of Ugandans in the North against the existing government from which many feel excluded.
The war arose out of a repressive and divisive political climate during colonial rule. British authorities utilized 'divide and rule' tactics that pitted various groups against each other, a dynamic that has been perpetuated by post-independence politics. Northerners, the British decided, were branded as the fighters, due to their tall stature; westerners were servants, and southerners the leaders in business and politics. These divisions created a post-independence North-South divide in Uganda, whereby the two regions competed for power and prestige. This divide, coupled with a history in Uganda of utilizing violence as a political tool, created the conditions that gave rise to the insurgency of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in 1986. When the current president, Youweri Museveni, and his National Resistance Movement took power that year, they alienated the northern people, creating perceptual and actual incentives for rebellion.
The Conflict Degenerates: 1986-1994
Since 1986, the insurgency within northern Uganda has undergone four stages, beginning with a more popular rebellion of former army officials and evolving into the current pseudo-spiritual warlordism of Joseph Kony and his LRA. To date, the LRA is comprised predominantly of abducted children who are brainwashed by rebel commanders and forced to fight and kill. At least 30,000 children have been abducted by the LRA to date. Due to these horrifying tactics, what initial support the rebellion enjoyed in the North has long faded. Alienated from their own people, the LRA has resorted to waging terror on the civilian population as a means to maintain attention and challenge the government. They do not however pose any serious threat to Museveni's regime.
After attempted peace talks facilitated by Betty Bigombe collapsed in 1994, the dynamics of the conflict changed drastically for the worse. Because the Government of Uganda was lending support to the southern Sudanese rebel Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), the Government of Sudan in turn extended safe haven to LRA rebels and provided them with arms caches. The West, particularly the United States, saw the war in Sudan as a front in its battle against the spread of Islamic fundamentalism, and pumped significant amounts of aid to the SPLA through northern Uganda. New elements of a war economy and arms trafficking made peace more elusive.
Missing Peace and New Hope: 1994-Present
President Museveni, since the early 1990's, has been hailed as a "new brand of African leader." He successfully curbed the national rise in HIV/AIDS rates, oversaw a robust and growing economy, and negotiated peaceful resolution to more than a dozen insurgencies across the country since taking office. Never, however, has he been able to deal successfully with the LRA.
Hardline members of his administration have remained firmly against negotiating a settlement of the conflict since the war's inception, preferring a military victory over the LRA. Museveni himself has often expressed serious doubts about the potential efficacy of negotiating with the rebel army. LRA leadership, namely Joseph Kony, is perceived to be irrational, and a military victory would shore up national confidence in Uganda's military strength and Museveni's leadership.
The military approach, however, exacerbates the North/South political divide, as the local population favors a negotiated settlement and Ugandan soldiers have been known to commit serious human rights violations against civilians in the region. Moreover, the war is fought by abducted children, and any military "solution" means fighting against these children. Religious and civil society leaders in the North are in agreement that the Ugandan government must take negotiations more seriously.
International pressure has brought the Government of Uganda and the LRA to the negotiating table on numerous occasions. After Bigombe's first failed attempt in 1994, subsequent attempts by the Community of Sant'Egidio and by the Carter Center also fell through. Mistrust between the government and the LRA led negotiations to fail even on the eves of their success.
In 1996, the Government of Uganda instituted its policy of confining the entire northern population to camps for the displaced to enable more effective civilian protection and to prevent the LRA from stealing food, children, and supplies from northern villages. The fighting and terror continued through all of these years.
Following September 11, 2001, the United States found an ally in the Museveni regime in its war on terror. The U.S. quickly declared the LRA a terrorist group and increased military aid to the Ugandan government. Recent battle victories against the LRA, coupled with a dramatic decrease in Sudan's assistance to the LRA with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Sudan, makes the time ripe for a negotiated end to the conflict.
A Suffering People
The consequences of the war cannot be overstated. At the end of 2003, Jan Egeland, the United Nations undersecretary-general for humanitarian affairs, told the BBC: "I cannot find any other part of the world that is having an emergency on the scale of Uganda that is getting so little international attention." On the ground in northern Uganda, the scene is shocking. Tens of thousands of civilians have been maimed or killed by the rebel LRA. More than 25,000 children aged seven to seventeen have been abducted from towns and camps. The government decision to hoard people into "protected villages" has degenerated into a displacement nightmare with 1.7 million displaced and 1000 dying each week. People in the camps are enduring disease, malnutrition, and nighttime attacks from the LRA. An old man living in one such camp told us, "Since 1985, we have just had restless nights...In some ways, we are already dead. We yearn for peace, but we have no hope anymore."
Over recent years, there has been some reason to hope. Thanks to international grassroots efforts, the conflict has gained greater attention from the international community. In October 2005, the International Criminal Court issued its landmark first indictments for top five rebel commanders. This has brought new momentum for regional militaries to arrest and demobilize the LRA forces, but unfortunately ICC influence has been negative in obstructing pacific means to end the war. In 2006, two UN Security Resolutions (1653 and 1663) called for the international community to explore ways to help end the LRA rebellion and stop the violence. Yet, there has been no success in such attempts.
Since the beginning of this year, the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) has agreed to host and mediate peace talks between the warring parties. In July, historic peace talks commenced between the Government of Uganda and the LRA. Many believe these talks are the best opportunity in over a decade to end the war.
Visit our Resources page for links to further reports and analysis.
The twenty-year-old war in northern Uganda is a complex conflict fuelled not only by the fighting of the Lord’s Resistance Army, which is waging war against the Ugandan government and terror against the Acholi tribe's civilian population, but also by the grievances of Ugandans in the North against the existing government from which many feel excluded.
The war arose out of a repressive and divisive political climate during colonial rule. British authorities utilized 'divide and rule' tactics that pitted various groups against each other, a dynamic that has been perpetuated by post-independence politics. Northerners, the British decided, were branded as the fighters, due to their tall stature; westerners were servants, and southerners the leaders in business and politics. These divisions created a post-independence North-South divide in Uganda, whereby the two regions competed for power and prestige. This divide, coupled with a history in Uganda of utilizing violence as a political tool, created the conditions that gave rise to the insurgency of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in 1986. When the current president, Youweri Museveni, and his National Resistance Movement took power that year, they alienated the northern people, creating perceptual and actual incentives for rebellion.
The Conflict Degenerates: 1986-1994
Since 1986, the insurgency within northern Uganda has undergone four stages, beginning with a more popular rebellion of former army officials and evolving into the current pseudo-spiritual warlordism of Joseph Kony and his LRA. To date, the LRA is comprised predominantly of abducted children who are brainwashed by rebel commanders and forced to fight and kill. At least 30,000 children have been abducted by the LRA to date. Due to these horrifying tactics, what initial support the rebellion enjoyed in the North has long faded. Alienated from their own people, the LRA has resorted to waging terror on the civilian population as a means to maintain attention and challenge the government. They do not however pose any serious threat to Museveni's regime.
After attempted peace talks facilitated by Betty Bigombe collapsed in 1994, the dynamics of the conflict changed drastically for the worse. Because the Government of Uganda was lending support to the southern Sudanese rebel Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), the Government of Sudan in turn extended safe haven to LRA rebels and provided them with arms caches. The West, particularly the United States, saw the war in Sudan as a front in its battle against the spread of Islamic fundamentalism, and pumped significant amounts of aid to the SPLA through northern Uganda. New elements of a war economy and arms trafficking made peace more elusive.
Missing Peace and New Hope: 1994-Present
President Museveni, since the early 1990's, has been hailed as a "new brand of African leader." He successfully curbed the national rise in HIV/AIDS rates, oversaw a robust and growing economy, and negotiated peaceful resolution to more than a dozen insurgencies across the country since taking office. Never, however, has he been able to deal successfully with the LRA.
Hardline members of his administration have remained firmly against negotiating a settlement of the conflict since the war's inception, preferring a military victory over the LRA. Museveni himself has often expressed serious doubts about the potential efficacy of negotiating with the rebel army. LRA leadership, namely Joseph Kony, is perceived to be irrational, and a military victory would shore up national confidence in Uganda's military strength and Museveni's leadership.
The military approach, however, exacerbates the North/South political divide, as the local population favors a negotiated settlement and Ugandan soldiers have been known to commit serious human rights violations against civilians in the region. Moreover, the war is fought by abducted children, and any military "solution" means fighting against these children. Religious and civil society leaders in the North are in agreement that the Ugandan government must take negotiations more seriously.
International pressure has brought the Government of Uganda and the LRA to the negotiating table on numerous occasions. After Bigombe's first failed attempt in 1994, subsequent attempts by the Community of Sant'Egidio and by the Carter Center also fell through. Mistrust between the government and the LRA led negotiations to fail even on the eves of their success.
In 1996, the Government of Uganda instituted its policy of confining the entire northern population to camps for the displaced to enable more effective civilian protection and to prevent the LRA from stealing food, children, and supplies from northern villages. The fighting and terror continued through all of these years.
Following September 11, 2001, the United States found an ally in the Museveni regime in its war on terror. The U.S. quickly declared the LRA a terrorist group and increased military aid to the Ugandan government. Recent battle victories against the LRA, coupled with a dramatic decrease in Sudan's assistance to the LRA with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Sudan, makes the time ripe for a negotiated end to the conflict.
A Suffering People
The consequences of the war cannot be overstated. At the end of 2003, Jan Egeland, the United Nations undersecretary-general for humanitarian affairs, told the BBC: "I cannot find any other part of the world that is having an emergency on the scale of Uganda that is getting so little international attention." On the ground in northern Uganda, the scene is shocking. Tens of thousands of civilians have been maimed or killed by the rebel LRA. More than 25,000 children aged seven to seventeen have been abducted from towns and camps. The government decision to hoard people into "protected villages" has degenerated into a displacement nightmare with 1.7 million displaced and 1000 dying each week. People in the camps are enduring disease, malnutrition, and nighttime attacks from the LRA. An old man living in one such camp told us, "Since 1985, we have just had restless nights...In some ways, we are already dead. We yearn for peace, but we have no hope anymore."
Over recent years, there has been some reason to hope. Thanks to international grassroots efforts, the conflict has gained greater attention from the international community. In October 2005, the International Criminal Court issued its landmark first indictments for top five rebel commanders. This has brought new momentum for regional militaries to arrest and demobilize the LRA forces, but unfortunately ICC influence has been negative in obstructing pacific means to end the war. In 2006, two UN Security Resolutions (1653 and 1663) called for the international community to explore ways to help end the LRA rebellion and stop the violence. Yet, there has been no success in such attempts.
Since the beginning of this year, the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) has agreed to host and mediate peace talks between the warring parties. In July, historic peace talks commenced between the Government of Uganda and the LRA. Many believe these talks are the best opportunity in over a decade to end the war.
Visit our Resources page for links to further reports and analysis.