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Uganda Conflict Action Network Analysis
Peter J. Quaranto and Michael Poffenberger
July 18, 2006

Introduction

The peace talks currently underway between the Government of Uganda (GoU) and Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) are the best opportunity in over a decade to end the twenty-year war in northern Uganda. Since the end of last year, the Government of South Sudan (GoSS), by its own initiative, has offered to mediate and host these talks. The involvement of such a strategic third party mediator, coupled with the apparent openness of the LRA and GoU to end the war, and mounting pressure on all parties to resolve the conflict, gives this process serious potential to succeed in both ending active violence and providing a framework to address deeper social and political grievances.

There has been little public attempt to date to interrogate the interests and stakes of those involved in these peace talks. Such analysis is crucial to unpack the potentiality of this peace process and to clarify the short and long term needs for lasting peace in northern Uganda. It is to that end that we undertake this analysis, with the hope that it might stimulate imaginative dialogue and ultimately contribute to building sustainable peace in the region.

Juba Peace Talks: How, Why and Who?

The foundation for the Juba peace talks began with an ultimatum issued by Sudan’s First Vice President Salva Kiir to the LRA as early as September 2005 in which he presented three options for the rebel group: engage peace talks, leave southern Sudan, or face military confrontation. In December, the LRA accepted an offer by the GoSS to mediate peace talks. In the early months of 2006, traditional leaders, including Acholi Paramount Chief Rwot Acana II, traveled to Juba to discuss prospects for this peace initiative. In March, the GoSS and LRA had reached an agreement on three points: that the GoSS would provide honest mediation for negotiations, that LRA hostilities in southern Sudan would cease, and that LRA fighters would leave Sudan if negotiations failed. Kiir made these points public to President Museveni at Museveni’s inauguration in May, setting in motion the events of the last two months to initiate the peace talks presently taking place.

On 15 May, LRA leader Joseph Kony agreed to Kiir’s offer for peace talks with the GoU, and sent a message to Museveni requesting GoU engagement of such an initiative. The following day, Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni expressed openness to talks with the LRA if hostilities ceased by July. After some hesitation, President Museveni also welcomed GoSS mediation. In preparations for the talks, President Museveni further stated that he would bypass International Criminal Court (ICC) indictments and grant amnesty to LRA leadership if a deal could be reached. The declaration of support for the talks by US Assistant Secretary of State Jendayi Frazer in June was also crucial in lending legitimacy to the process. At the end of June, the appointed 15-man LRA negotiating team arrived in Juba to begin talks. The Ugandan government’s delegation arrived in early July.

GoSS leadership to both host and mediate negotiations makes these talks unlike any of the past. While a faction in the government may have initiated this process, it is clear that the full force of the GoSS is behind it. GoSS leadership in the talks is a way to demonstrate its sovereignty and growing influence in the region. The GoSS has much to gain from peacefully expelling the LRA from Sudan. There is evidence that elements of the northern National Islamic Front (NIF) are continuing to use the LRA as a proxy militia to destabilize the South. The LRA’s presence in southern Sudan provides a continuous threat to implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Further, the LRA is embedded within networks in southern Sudan that have not yet joined the Southern Sudanese government coalition. This makes any SPLA military offensive against the LRA undesirable. The GoSS is thus keen to demobilize the LRA through pacific means.

The LRA, recognizing the stakes for the GoSS, wants to avoid military confrontation with SPLA forces. The LRA also recognizes the increasing pressure they will face from other forces, especially UN missions in Sudan and Democratic Republic of the Congo (UNMIS and MONUC). Concerned about the prospects of arrest and trial at The Hague, LRA leaders may be willing to take advantage of an offer of amnesty in return for returning to civilian life. LRA support networks, scattered in small groups in the Acholi Diaspora, are also supporting the talks as a framework within which they can publicly express their grievances against the GoU. With growing media attention, they believe they can expose the injustices of the NRM government and gain reparations for past ills.

Finally, the war has become an increasing liability to the reputation of the GoU. Northern leaders have united their voices and increased pressure. The crisis in northern Uganda has become an embarrassment for the government and a stain on its once exalted reputation with the West. With Museveni’s repeal of term limits to win a third term in elections, his regime has suffered a significant fall from grace, and currently enjoys only cautious support from donor countries. Ending the war would redeem President Museveni’s image abroad, especially if it were accomplished before the 2007 British Commonwealth meetings to be held in Uganda. As the GoU has not secured permission to enter DR Congo because of past illegal incursions, they have to accept other means to end the war, namely these talks. Moreover, the GoU has sought a strong diplomatic and trading partnership with the GoSS; ill will in these talks could jeopardize that relationship with regional economic and security implications. With the rise of the GoSS, potential secession of northern Uganda to a state with southern Sudan raises additional concerns for the national government and provides another incentive to engage the Juba process in full.

The confluence of all these factors has led the GoSS, GoU and LRA to the table in Juba. Due to the interests of the parties involved, with careful mediation and pressure from key stakeholders, the talks provide a viable opportunity to end Africa’s longest running war.

Engaging Talks: Policy Scenarios

Perhaps the greatest challenge of these peace talks will be overcoming discord in expectations. The GoU has presented a peace deal, offering amnesty and reintegration packages in exchange for cessation of hostilities, disarmament and demobilization. Within the LRA, there appears to be mixed expectations. Top LRA leadership, weary from combat and worried about ICC indictments, is likely prioritizing post-conflict security and livelihood guarantees. However, the wider LRA network, represented by the appointed delegation in Juba, have expressed desire to address the root causes of the conflict, illuminate injustices and achieve a power-sharing agreement. In their position paper, they have called for the UPDF to be disbanded, displacement camps to be dismantled and reparations for government atrocities against northerners.

Such dissonance makes the role of third-party mediation crucial. Skilled mediators can build confidence and cultivate consensus by determining and setting negotiation terms that are acceptable to both parties. Ideally, third-party mediators rely on observers and non-voting delegations to help the peace process. The GoSS has demonstrated its willingness to draw on such valuable resources by recently extending invitations to northern religious and traditional leaders to attend the talks. International delegations from neighboring countries and Western nations also have the opportunity to provide backing as observers.

Entering the talks, the GoU must consider several possible outcomes. First, the government must reflect on the needs of northern Ugandans for peace. Museveni has made clear that he will offer amnesty to LRA leadership if they accept a peace deal and agree to cease hostilities by his deadline of 12 September. While some have criticized this move as undermining the ICC, northern Ugandan leaders have expressed full support for Museveni’s offer of amnesty, conveying that longer term issues of justice can be addressed after the cessation of active violence. The war has denied justice, in the broadest sense, to millions of Ugandans by depriving them of such basic rights as security, freedom of movement, cultural expression and livelihood opportunities for the last twenty years. Once those basic rights have been restored, the traditional, religious and political leaders of northern Uganda will help set the agenda for longer term restoration; in Acholi tradition, restorative justice is well respected and can be employed within the context of reintegrating former LRA rebels. Accountability measures could be enacted at a later time if needed, in particular to help address grievances suffered by non-Acholi northerners.

The GoU will also consider whether it is willing to facilitate national dialogue, truth-telling mechanisms, or even some form of power-sharing agreement. While a structural change is unlikely, the government should be supportive of processes that build trust and relationships between segments of society that have been polarized and separated for several generations. Lasting peace in northern Uganda will require not only disbanding LRA structure, but also addressing northern grievances of social, political and economic marginalization. Peace talks give the GoU an opportunity to acknowledge such realities and initiate processes for their transformation. It would be a mistake for talks not to include representation of the needs and agency of the Acholi people. While direct communication with Kony and LRA Deputy Vincent Otti as a track of negotiations parallel to the formal Juba process could prove helpful, the government of Uganda should not use the more narrow concerns of LRA leaders as a justification to avoid addressing deeper grievances.

For the LRA delegation at the talks, there must be recognition that addressing the root causes of the conflict is an undertaking that should extend far beyond Juba. The LRA delegation cannot legitimately represent the needs and wishes of the people of northern Uganda. A history of terror against those very people makes such representation impossible. A reasonable hope for the LRA delegation would be to commence processes such as truth-telling mechanisms and national dialogue that can be enacted post-conflict to empower northerners. If the LRA does so, it must be willing to acknowledge its own atrocities and accept mechanisms for restorative justice as means of compensation to victims of the war.

Role of International Community

As talks proceed, elevated attention and more responsible policy by the United States, donor countries and regional institutions can be decisive to their success. First, the international community can monitor the talks, holding actors accountable to the process. In past talks, schizophrenic signals from the government and corruption within the UPDF have undermined talks. High-level monitoring can raise the profile of the talks, pressuring government representatives to remain fully committed to the success of negotiations. The United States and other donor countries should stand willing, at the invitation of the GoSS, to support and encourage the process when needed by sending envoys and making public statements.

As a non-signatory to the ICC, the United States may be able to impact the talks in ways that European countries cannot. The European countries, for their part, can urge the ICC to show restraint and to employ Article 53 of the Rome Statute, which specifically allows for deferral of prosecution if it is in the “interest of victims” or other “interests of justice.” Under Article 53(4), the Prosecutor can reconsider a decision at any time “based on new facts or information.” The ICC should recognize Museveni’s offer of amnesty, which is strongly supported by the local population, as new and relevant information. ICC disapproval of talks not only keeps Kony and Otti from directly participating in the process, but may also derail talks when discussions shift to post-conflict security guarantees. Kony and Otti have already stated their concern to northern leaders about being arrested after giving up arms, similar to what happened with Charles Taylor, the former President of Liberia.

Second, donor governments can help build a peace dividend so that if an agreement is reached, the financial and political resources will be available for its implementation to the benefit of all parties involved. The return of displaced peoples, compensation of victims and reintegration of rebel fighters will require extensive international support. The government’s ability to deliver on these needs may determine the success of peace talks. Finally, the international community can ensure that the ultimate stakeholders, northern Ugandans themselves, are given a voice and priority in the process. Their involvement – through their religious leaders, traditional elders and political officials – will hold all parties accountable. It will further remind all that the priority is peace, not for political gain, but for the people caught amidst the horror of this war.

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