The Bush Administration and the Juba Peace Process: Missing in Action
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Negotiations currently taking place in Juba, Sudan to end the twenty year war between the rebel Lord’s Resistance Army and Government of Uganda offer the best chance ever to settle the conflict peacefully. Yet the United States Government, a strong partner of the Government of Uganda with far-reaching regional influence, has yet to definitively endorse the negotiations or to offer support to strengthen the prospects for the talks’ success. A lack of priority focus on the issue and initial skepticism regarding the viability of the negotiations has led to deadly complacency amongst government officials.
Members of the U.S. Congress, compelled by growing concern amongst the American public, have urged the Bush Administration to act more decisively in support of the talks, but have received no response.
Facing a historic opportunity to end the reign of terror experienced by the people of northern Uganda and southern Sudan, U.S. State Department officials have made only four public statements in six months related to the talks:
• June 20th, 2006: During her first visit to northern Uganda, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Africa Jendayi Frazer, moved by the suffering she witnessed, made this statement: “We believe that the priority has to be peace. And so, as for the pursuit of that peace, we are quite open on how we achieve it. But that is the priority: to stop the war. And if the government of Uganda can come to some agreement with the LRA that has to be the priority.” However, days later, the State Department backtracked, denying this was a statement of support for negotiations.
• November 2nd, 2006: Four months later, finally breaking official silence on the talks, the State Department released a two-sentence statement that “welcomed” the ceasefire, but fell short of officially endorsing the talks. “On November 1, 2006, the Government of Uganda and the Lord’s Resistance Army agreed to renew the Cessation of Hostilities first formulated on August 26. We welcome this development and urge adherence to the agreement as a step toward a peaceful solution to the long-standing conflict in northern Uganda and the region.”
• November 16th, 2006: Speaking in Kampala, U.S. Ambassador to Uganda Stephen Browning announced that the U.S. would provide $90 million to address post-conflict challenges if the talks succeed (note: only if they succeed), and commented, “The [International Criminal Court] is not a hurdle to the talks, instead it is the reason why we have peace talks today…The U.S. is very pleased to see the talks getting underway and the engagement of the rebels and government in order to end the fighting.”
• November 22nd, 2006: Responding to UN Humanitarian Coordinator Jan Egeland’s report to the Security Council on the talks, Jackie Wolcott Sanders, a leading U.S. official at the UN, “voiced support for the Juba peace process and welcomed the 1 November signing of the renewed Cessation of Hostilities Agreement…Pending a successful agreement, support would also be given to reconstruction efforts.”
Overwhelming local support for the process should be matched by strong statements and active engagement by the USG and international community. Significant hurdles remain to be overcome, and U.S. actions will have serious impact on the outcome.
If ensuring the war ends is to truly be a priority for the Bush Administration, the following steps should be taken to strengthen the Juba peace process:
• A public statement should be made clearly endorsing the talks. Public support for the process can build the confidence of the parties to the talks, and would act as a form of accountability by sending the message that the actions of the parties will affect future U.S. policies.
• Constructive dialogue with the Sudanese government in Khartoum should take place to prevent the Khartoum regime from taking measures to derail the process.
• Pressure should be placed on the Government of Uganda to abide by the terms of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement, specifically to ensure that Ugandan soldiers are pulled away from ceasefire zones to expedite the process of LRA gathering in the designated zones.
• Logistical and technical support should be provided to bolster the mediation of the Government of South Sudan and the effectiveness of the Cessation of Hostilities Monitoring Team.
• Financial support should be offered to the UN’s Juba Initiative Fund as funding gaps emerge and especially if there is an extension to talks.
• A massive increase in humanitarian and development assistance for war-affected areas should be announced, especially if the Juba talks succeed. Targeted humanitarian assistance can assist the early stages of resettlement for displaced people, community reconciliation, the protection of land rights, and other needs.
• Policymakers should develop a clear plan of action regarding how to deal with International Criminal Court indictments for rebel leaders, which could include advocating that the UN Security Council suspend the arrest warrants for one year to give negotiations space to proceed and explore alternative justice mechanisms.
Negotiations currently taking place in Juba, Sudan to end the twenty year war between the rebel Lord’s Resistance Army and Government of Uganda offer the best chance ever to settle the conflict peacefully. Yet the United States Government, a strong partner of the Government of Uganda with far-reaching regional influence, has yet to definitively endorse the negotiations or to offer support to strengthen the prospects for the talks’ success. A lack of priority focus on the issue and initial skepticism regarding the viability of the negotiations has led to deadly complacency amongst government officials.
Members of the U.S. Congress, compelled by growing concern amongst the American public, have urged the Bush Administration to act more decisively in support of the talks, but have received no response.
Facing a historic opportunity to end the reign of terror experienced by the people of northern Uganda and southern Sudan, U.S. State Department officials have made only four public statements in six months related to the talks:
• June 20th, 2006: During her first visit to northern Uganda, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Africa Jendayi Frazer, moved by the suffering she witnessed, made this statement: “We believe that the priority has to be peace. And so, as for the pursuit of that peace, we are quite open on how we achieve it. But that is the priority: to stop the war. And if the government of Uganda can come to some agreement with the LRA that has to be the priority.” However, days later, the State Department backtracked, denying this was a statement of support for negotiations.
• November 2nd, 2006: Four months later, finally breaking official silence on the talks, the State Department released a two-sentence statement that “welcomed” the ceasefire, but fell short of officially endorsing the talks. “On November 1, 2006, the Government of Uganda and the Lord’s Resistance Army agreed to renew the Cessation of Hostilities first formulated on August 26. We welcome this development and urge adherence to the agreement as a step toward a peaceful solution to the long-standing conflict in northern Uganda and the region.”
• November 16th, 2006: Speaking in Kampala, U.S. Ambassador to Uganda Stephen Browning announced that the U.S. would provide $90 million to address post-conflict challenges if the talks succeed (note: only if they succeed), and commented, “The [International Criminal Court] is not a hurdle to the talks, instead it is the reason why we have peace talks today…The U.S. is very pleased to see the talks getting underway and the engagement of the rebels and government in order to end the fighting.”
• November 22nd, 2006: Responding to UN Humanitarian Coordinator Jan Egeland’s report to the Security Council on the talks, Jackie Wolcott Sanders, a leading U.S. official at the UN, “voiced support for the Juba peace process and welcomed the 1 November signing of the renewed Cessation of Hostilities Agreement…Pending a successful agreement, support would also be given to reconstruction efforts.”
Overwhelming local support for the process should be matched by strong statements and active engagement by the USG and international community. Significant hurdles remain to be overcome, and U.S. actions will have serious impact on the outcome.
If ensuring the war ends is to truly be a priority for the Bush Administration, the following steps should be taken to strengthen the Juba peace process:
• A public statement should be made clearly endorsing the talks. Public support for the process can build the confidence of the parties to the talks, and would act as a form of accountability by sending the message that the actions of the parties will affect future U.S. policies.
• Constructive dialogue with the Sudanese government in Khartoum should take place to prevent the Khartoum regime from taking measures to derail the process.
• Pressure should be placed on the Government of Uganda to abide by the terms of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement, specifically to ensure that Ugandan soldiers are pulled away from ceasefire zones to expedite the process of LRA gathering in the designated zones.
• Logistical and technical support should be provided to bolster the mediation of the Government of South Sudan and the effectiveness of the Cessation of Hostilities Monitoring Team.
• Financial support should be offered to the UN’s Juba Initiative Fund as funding gaps emerge and especially if there is an extension to talks.
• A massive increase in humanitarian and development assistance for war-affected areas should be announced, especially if the Juba talks succeed. Targeted humanitarian assistance can assist the early stages of resettlement for displaced people, community reconciliation, the protection of land rights, and other needs.
• Policymakers should develop a clear plan of action regarding how to deal with International Criminal Court indictments for rebel leaders, which could include advocating that the UN Security Council suspend the arrest warrants for one year to give negotiations space to proceed and explore alternative justice mechanisms.